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When Discretion Leads to Distortion: Recognizing 
Pre-Arrest Sentence-Manipulation Claims Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Jeffrey L. Fisher 
"[C]omplexities ... are not to be escaped by simple, rigid rules which, 
by avoiding some abuses, generate others." 1 
- Justice Felix Frankfurter 
INTRODUCTION 
The government's main purpose and policy in the "war on drugs" 
is to get drug dealers off the streets.2 Because of the furtive nature of 
the drug trade, undercover operations are an essential tool in performing 
this task. Courts therefore allow the government the enormous discre-
tionary power necessary to run "stings." For example, government 
agents have almost exclusive control over who gets targeted for stings, 
the amount of drugs3 involved in the transaction, and how long the sting 
lasts. This level of authority carries with it an inherent risk of abuse.4 
Variations in these factors can have a profound impact on the extent of 
a defendant's criminal conduct before a sentencing court - and there-
fore potentially on the length of a defendant's sentence.5 Until 1987, 
abuses of these investigative powers or, as is more often the case, ine-
qualities in criminal conduct arising from the legitimate use of such 
powers, could be compensated for by the sentencing court's use of dis-
1. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
2. See United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he ulti-
mate law enforcement goal is to get drug dealers off the streets . . . . "). The war on 
drugs, launched during the Reagan era, also includes treatment and educational propo-
nents, but heavily emphasizes law enforcement. See Michael Tonry, Race and the War 
on Drugs, 1994 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 25, 25. Thus, the success or failure of this war rests 
primarily on the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts. 
3. Sting operations occur in enforcement efforts other than drugs busts. However, 
this Note focuses on drug stings as a paradigm that highlights the problem of sentence 
manipulation. 
4. See United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.D. 1995); United 
States v. Monocchi, 836 F. Supp. 79, 88 (D. Conn. 1993). 
5. See United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he govern-
ment, in the carrying out of its investigative and prosecutorial functions, [has] great 
power to dictate the options which will ultimately be available to the sentencing 
court."). 
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cretion.6 By looking at the circumstances surrounding the defendant's 
conduct, the com:t could ensure that the defendant's sentence matched 
his culpability. 
However, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guide-
lines") such judicial flexibility no longer exists. The Guidelines, drafted 
amid growing criticism of the inequities of discretionary sentencing, 
were designed to restrict judicial discretion and thereby reduce disparity 
in sentencing.7 Yet many judges and commentators contend that certain 
sections of the Guidelines have failed to achieve this goal. 8 As one 
commentator put it: "The sentencing reform movement has not re-
stricted sentencing discretion so much as it has transferred discretion 
from judges to prosecutors. " 9 
The identical transfer of discretion has also taken place from 
judges to federal agents and investigators.10 As investigators become in-
creasingly knowledgeable about the inflexible Guidelines, they are 
utilizing their discretion to manipulate the sentences of their subjects in 
ways that they never could have before. 11 But the harsh prison terms 
that result from such investigative strategies are causing several courts 
to rethink their theories governing the relationship between stings and 
aggregate sentencing.12 
6. See United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1994); John M. 
Walker, Jr., Loosening the Administrative Handcuffs: Discretion and Responsibility 
Under the Guidelines, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 551, 551 (1993); see also Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989) (noting that, prior to the Guidelines, "[t]or more than 
a century, federal judges .•. enjoyed wide discretion to detennine the appropriate sen-
tence in individual cases and ..• exercised special authority to detennine the sentencing 
factors to be applied in any given case"). 
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994); U.S. SENTENCING COMMN., GUIDELINES MAN· 
UAL [hereinafter USSG] ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1994); Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 
2053 (1996); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 901, 901 (1991) (describing the supposed 
virtues of reducing judicial discretion and how they led to the Guidelines). 
8. See generally Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End 
to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991). 
9. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 926. 
10. See Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure to 
Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. 
L. REV. 187, 206-13; see also infra text accompanying notes 60-62. 
11. See Andrew G. Deiss, Comment, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment: Pre-
Arrest Sentence Manipulation by Investigators Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 1994 
U. Cm. LEGAL F. 419, 438 ("In organizing undercover operations, law enforcement of-
ficers possess extraordinary power to control a criminal defendant's sentence by orches-
trating the circumstances surrounding a crime, thereby taking advantage of the inflexi-
ble sentences established under the Guidelines and the mandatory minimums."). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425, 427-28 (1st Cir. 1995) (ex-
pressing great concern at the possibility that law enforcement agents may prolong stings 
"to make up for any [perceived] shortfall[s] in prior punishments"); United States v. 
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Compare the following two drug cases that resulted in virtually 
identical sentences. Eric Payne was a habitual drug pusher who sold 
crack out of his apartment, bringing in as much as $1000 to $2000 a 
day.13 After a tape recorder malfunctioned on one purchase, government 
agents successfully negotiated and purchased two ounces of crack from 
Payne.14 Payne was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted on the basis of 
the two ounces - the equivalent of 56.7 grams15 - of crack.16 Sales of 
over fifty grams of crack carry a mandatory ten-year prison sentence, 17 
and this proved to constitute the lion's share of Payne's seventeen-and-
one-half year sentence.18 
Angela Diane Reese was also a habitual drug pusher, but she was 
comparatively small-time. Reese, a "street-comer peddler" - also a 
single mother and first-time offender - sold crack to an undercover 
agent on seven different occasions. Perhaps not coincidentally, the sev-
Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994) (expressing concern that the system no 
longer ensures that defendants will be punished according to their culpability); United 
States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1260-61 (D. Minn. 1990) ("The Court is troubled 
by the fact that the guidelines, in conjunction with certain investigative methods, can 
multiply a few months' jail time into a potential multi-year sentence."). 
13. See United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1205 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 1056 (1996). 
14. See 63 F.3d at 1203-04. 
15. See USSG § ·2Dl.1 application note 10 (1994) (drug measurement conversion 
table). 
16. See Payne, 63 F.3d at 1202. The government also prosecuted Payne on the ba-
sis of the sale in which the tape recorder malfunctioned and on one count of conspiracy 
to distribute crack and other narcotics. Payne was acquitted of the former and convicted 
of the latter. 63 F.3d at 1202-03. 
17. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(l)(A) (1994). The Guidelines incorporate "mandatory 
minimum" sentences, like the above statute, into their base level sentences. Mandatory 
minimum sentences, therefore, operate as a floor for the Guidelines. See Philip Oliss, 
Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1878 (1995). If the Guidelines, after con-
sidering possible reductions, dictate a sentence below a mandatory minimum, the 
mandatory minimum controls, thereby giving the defendant the longer sentence. USSG 
§ 5Gl.l(b) (1994). There is one exception to this rule. Section 80001(a) of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 80001(a), 
108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553), allows courts to go below 
the mandatory minimum when the defendant meets several criteria, which include hav-
ing minimal prior convictions, performing a nonmanagerial role in the crime, and telling 
the government everything he knows about the offense(s). Under this exception, how-
ever, courts still must follow the Guidelines. See generally Oliss, supra, at 1882-92 
(evaluating § 80001 and concluding that it fails to correct adequately the disparities that 
result from quantity-based, mandatory minimum sentences). 
18. See Payne, 63 F.3d at 1202. Payne was sentenced to 210 months of imprison-
ment on the basis of the two-gram sale and one count of conspiracy to distribute crack 
and other narcotics. See 63 F.3d at 1202. 
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enth sale brought the aggregate amount of drugs to fifty-nine grams. 19 
This placed Reese over the "magic number"- the fifty-gram threshold 
that carries the mandatory ten-year prison sentence,20 compared to only 
a five-year minimum sentence for 5 to 49.9 grams.21 Reese was sen-
tenced based on all seven sales to fourteen years in prison, after which 
she remarked in dismay, "There are people that murder, rape and kill 
who don't get that much time."22 
The truth is that, short of finding extreme governmental miscon-
duct, most courts feel that they have no choice but to treat the fifty 
grams that Payne dealt in one sale exactly like the fifty grams that 
Reese accumulated in seven sales.23 Under section 2Dl.1 of the Guide-
lines, sentences for drug offenses are determined by aggregating the 
quantity of drugs involved in the relevant criminal transaction(s).24 Fur-
ther, none of the Guidelines' enumerated departure provisions addresses 
the possibility of excessive sentences due to protracted sting operations 
- indeed, nothing in the Guidelines' legislative history or numerous 
policy statements mentions the issue.25 Thus, most courts end up sen-
tencing all drug defendants according to one factor, and one factor only: 
quantity - irrespective of the number of transactions that it took to 
reach certain thresholds. 
Yet many small-time defendants like Reese claim that this scheme, 
in the words of one commentator, "introduce[s] disparity in a system 
19. See Robert L. Steinback, Sentencing Rules Distort Logic of Court System, 
MIAMI HERALD, July 16, 1993, at lB. 
20. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a)-84l(b)(l)(A) (1994); United States v. Barth, 788 F. 
Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 990 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 
1993). 
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B) (1994). The 50 grams also made Reese's crime a 
federal crime. Under Florida state law, Reese would have faced three to seven years in 
prison and would have served about 28 months. See Steinback, supra note 19, at lB. 
22. Id. Reese's sentence was affirmed without opinion by the Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 262 
(1995). 
23. For example, the Eighth Circuit stated: "While we are concerned with the 
government conduct in this case, [the defendant] has failed to demonstrate that the gov-
ernment's conduct was outrageous .... [A]dopting [the defendant's] theory would re-
quire us to abandon [our] long-established rule of entrapment which focuses on the pre-
disposition of the defendant to commit crime." Barth, 990 F.2d at 424-25 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
24. See USSG § 201.1, application note 6 (1994). 
25. See infra Part I.A.1. The latter point does open up an avenue for departure. 
Courts may depart under unusual circumstances that were not adequately considered by 
the Sentencing Commission. See infra text accompanying note 43. However, the Barth 
court, like the others that share its approach to these types of claims, failed to inquire 
into the latter possibility. 
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intended to eliminate disparity. " 26 These defendants point out that just 
punishment flows. from more than mere quantity or harm; culpability -
which consists of factors like the number and frequency of the sales at 
issue and their role in the offense - also matters, and can be over-
represented easily under these rules. Therefore, these defendants argue, 
rigidly applying section 201.1 can lead to a serious and unintended re-
sult: Government investigators have the ability - and arguably the in-
centive - to manipulate defendants' sentences by exercising nearly 
complete control over the quantity of drugs involved in the crimes for 
which they are charged. This practice has been termed "sentence ma-
nipulation."27 Yet while most courts concede the potential for govern-
mental abuse and disparate sentences under these circumstances, they 
remain hesitant to scrutinize governmental investigative conduct when it 
only affects the length of a defendant's sentence.28 
26. Sandra Guerra, The New Sentencing Entrapment and Sentence M{lnipulation 
Defenses, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 181, 181 (1995). 
27. Sentence manipulation is different from a similar partial defense known as 
"sentence entrapment," though the two claims are often confused. See Eric P. Berlin, 
Reducing Harm as a Determinative Factor: The Hidden Problem with Sentencing En-
trapment, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 186, 186 (1995); see also United States v. Chavez-
Vasquez, 64 F.3d 667 (unpublished disposition), 1995 WL 492903, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 
17, 1995) (analyzing a sentence manipulation claim by the sentence entrapment test for 
predisposition); United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1551 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct 211 (1994); United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(same). Sentence entrapment is government conduct that "overcomes the will of an in-
dividual predisposed only to dealing in small quantities for the purpose of increasing 
the amount of drugs in the conspiracy and the resulting sentence of the entrapped 
defendant." United States v. Hulett, 22 F.3d 779, 782 (8th Cir.) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 217 (1994). Thus, sentence entrap-
ment claims focus on the predisposition of the defendant - and specifically on whether 
the defendant would have been willing and able to create as much harm without the 
government's help. Sentence manipulation claims typically focus on the relationship be-
tween the blameworthiness of the defendant and the conduct of the government, there 
being no dispute as to whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the number of 
transactions. 
Notably, the Sentencing Commission has responded, at least partially, to the prob-
lem of sentencing entrapment by amending § 2Dl.1 with two application notes. The 
first note pennits a downward departure when the defendant either "did not intend to 
produce or was not capable of producing the negotiated amount" USSG § 2Dl.l, ap-
plication note 12 (1994) (adopted Nov. l, 1993). The second note pennits a downward 
departure when the government sold drugs to the defendant at an "artificially low 
price" that led the defendant to purchase significantly more drugs than his "resources 
would have allowed." USSG § 2Dl.1, application note 17 (1994) (adopted Nov. 1, 
1993). For a good discussion of these application notes and the doctrine of sentence en-
trapment, see United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245 (9th Cir. 1995). 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (declin-
ing to "subject isolated government conduct to a special brand of scrutiny when its ef-
fect is felt in sentence, as opposed to offense, detennination ... [barring government] 
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This Note rejects this stance. It argues that sentence manipulation 
should be a legally viable partial defense - a defense that does not 
warrant complete exoneration, but does warrant a reduced sentence 
when the government's investigative techniques place a quantity of 
drugs before the court29 that overrepresents the defendant's culpability, 
or individual blameworthiness. Part I describes the policies and objec-
tives that underlie the Guidelines, but then demonstrates how the rigid 
application of quantity-based sentencing provisions can lead to sentence 
manipulation that thwarts these goals, particularly the goal of sentenc-
ing according to culpability. Part II describes how courts have re-
sponded to sentence manipulation claims. It contends that the majority 
of the courts' position - examining police practices under the due pro-
cess "outrageous government conduct" test - is misplaced and inade-
quate, while the minority's position of departing downward for less-
than-constitutional violations is more appropriate and promising. Part 
ill proposes alternative legal formulas for recognizing sentence manipu-
lation as a viable and effective partial defense: allowing it as . a special 
circumstance that warrants a downward departure under the Guidelines 
or amending the Guidelines themselves to limit the number of transac-
tions that may constitute relevant conduct. 
1 QUANTITY-BASED SENTENCING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
This Part describes the impulses behind the adoption of a rigid 
quantity-based sentencing scheme and argues that this scheme is easily 
thwarted because it gives government investigators the ability to manip-
ulate defendants' sentences by continuing to conduct transactions long 
after the extent of the defendants' culpability has been determined. Sec-
tion I.A recounts the reasons for creating the Guidelines and elaborates 
on the policies that they attempt to achieve. Section I.B shows how the 
drug sentencing provisions of the Guidelines embody these objectives, 
but asserts that rigidly applying these provisions places too much power 
in the hands of investigators, particularly undercover agents, and, there-
conduct so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government 
from invoking judicial processes." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
29. The quantity of drugs before the court is called the offender's "relevant con-
duct," which largely determines his "offense level" under the Guidelines. USSG 
§ lBl.3 (1994). A defendant's relevant conduct includes not only the crime(s) of con-
viction but also includes separate offenses of "a character for which § 3Dl.2(d) would 
require grouping of multiple counts, [and] all acts and omissions ... that were part of 
the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." 
USSG § 1Bl.3(a)(2) (1994). Thus, even if a defendant plea bargains, or is found guilty 
of only one count of a several count indictment, the court must consider all other alleg-
edly related criminal actions in crafting a sentence. See also infra note 43. 
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fore, can lead to sentence manipulation. Section I.C rejects the principal 
argument against reducing sentences in cases of sentence manipulation 
- that offenders should always be punished according to the total 
amount of harm that they cause, regardless of police tactics - and con-
tends that sentence manipulation is a serious problem that should be 
recognized by courts. 
A. The General Objectives of the Guidelines 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were created amid growing dis-
satisfaction over the inconsistency and ineffectiveness of criminal pun-
ishment. Many offenders were serving only a small portion of their 
lengthy sentences30 while rates of recidivism and violent crime contin-
ued to rise.31 Further, judges were not required to explain the sentences 
that they mandated - which often varied greatly from their colleagues' 
sentences under similar circumstances - and appellate courts had virtu-
ally no authority to rectify the differences.32 The system was seen as so 
unfair and ineffective that Senator Edward Kennedy termed it a "na-
tional disgrace."33 Consequently, the Guidelines sought to create new, 
more consistent procedures for the American sentencing system and, in 
doing so, shifted the focus of its overall penal philosophy from rehabili-
tation to desert. 34 
1. The Goals of the Guideline System 
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act,35 which cre-
ated the United States Sentencing Commission. The Act, and the Guide-
lines that the Commission drafted pursuant to its mandates, had three 
main objectives. First, they sought to reduce "disparity in sentences im-
30. See Edward M. Kennedy, Sentencing Reform - An Evolutionary Process, 3 
FED. SENTENCING REP. 271, 271 (1991). 
31. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1938, 1945 (1988) (claiming that "pub-
lic concern about the increase in the rate of drug use and distribution, violent crime, and 
recidivism led to the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act [of 1984,]" 
which contained the Sentencing Reform Act). The public had cause for concern. The 
number of inmates serving sentences increased 123% between 1980 and 1989. BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BJS DATA REPORT: 1989, at 78 (1990). 
32. See Andrew von Hirsch, Numerical Grids or Guiding Principles?, in THE 
SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 47, 47 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 
1987); Kennedy, supra note 30, at 271. 
33. See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 271. 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 45-47. 
35. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-39, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 
u.s.c. §§ 3551-3673 (1994); 28 u.s.c. §§ 991-998 (1994)). 
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posed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders. " 36 
This was perhaps. the single most important objective behind the Guide-
lines.37 Second, "Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through 
a system that impose[d] appropriately different sentences for criminal 
conduct of differing severity. " 38 Third, Congress sought to achieve 
"honesty in sentencing" - that is, to create a system in which all of-
fenders served the vast majority of their prison sentences.39 Through ac-
complishing these three goals, Congress also sought to increase deter-
rence40 and keep defendants in jail in order to protect the public from 
further crimes,41 while still attempting to prevent overcrowding in 
prisons.42 
It was predictable that a system designed to do so many things 
would have to be quite structured and rather inflexible, and the Guide-
lines certainly possess those qualities. Under the Guidelines, a judge 
now derives a sentence by aligning mechanically two factors on a grid: 
(1) the "offense level," which essentially measures the severity of the 
defendant's relevant conduct and (2) the defendant's crimin~ history. 
The grid produces a "heartland" sentencing range from which the 
judge may "depart" only in limited enumerated situations or under un-
usual circumstances of a kind not considered by the drafters of the 
Guidelines.43 The idea is that by forcing judges to treat nearly all of-
36. USSG, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1994); see also Berlin, 
supra note 10, at 191 n.24 (collecting references regarding the concern over sentencing 
disparity from the Sentencing Reform Act's legislative history). 
37. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMN., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 8 (1987); Alschuler, supra note 7, at 901; w. 
Clinton Terry ill, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and Police Officer Discretion, in THE 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21, 21 (Dean J. 
Champion ed., 1989). 
38. USSG, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1994); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1994) (stat-
ing that the Guidelines' sentences are intended "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense"); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMN., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
AND POLICY STATEMENTS 13 (1987) ("The increase in uniformity was not, however, to 
be achieved through sacrificing proportionality."). 
39. See USSG. ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1994). 
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (1994). 
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (1994). 
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1994). 
43. Under the Guidelines, the defendant's offense level is determined by combin-
ing the defendant's relevant conduct, or "base offense(s)," with any special characteris-
tics, such as the use of a firearm, and adjustments for things like the defendant's accept-
ance of responsibility. The offense level, ranging from 1 to 43, then is matched with the 
appropriate criminal history category, ranging from 1 to 6, to provide the appropriate 
sentencing range. Sentencing ranges are quite narrow; for example, a 10-year sentence 
can vary by only about one year. Courts may depart from these ranges only in certain 
enumerated situations or under unusual circumstances that the drafters of the Guidelines 
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fenders alike, sentences will necessarily be less disparate than under the 
old, discretionary. system. 
2. The Shift in Penal Philosophy 
Disparity cannot be reduced in a vacuum. Disparity can only be 
defined - and then reduced - in terms of a rationale and certain de-
fined factors.44 Thus, the Commission adopted the philosophy that de-
fendants should be sentenced according to their culpability45 - and that 
defendant's culpability was primarily a function of the amount of socie-
tal harm they caused. In espousing this rationale, the Guidelines embod-
ied a theoretical shift in the theory of just punishment from a rehabilita-
tive model to a "just deserts" model.46 
The primary characteristic of the Commission's just deserts model 
is its focus on the amount of harm as the dominant factor in determin-
failed to consider. When courts depart, though, they must do it under the geqeral frame-
work of the Guidelines. See generally PAUL BORMAN ET AL., WmTE CoUAR CRIME: LAW 
AND PRACTICE (forthcoming 1996) (providing an excellent overview of how the Guide-
lines work). 
44. See Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Functions, in THE SEN-
TENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 3, 9-10. 
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994) (directing courts to craft a sentence com-
mensurate with the offender's culpability); USSG ch. 1, pt A (1994) (same). 
46. See Berlin, supra note 10, at 191; Steven P. Lab, Potential Deterrent Effects of 
the Guidelines, in THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, supra note 37, at 33, 46. Popular support for a just deserts, or retributive, model of 
criminal punishment had been gaining momentum in the period leading up to the adop-
tion of the Guidelines. See, e.g., WAYNER LAFAVE & AUSTIN w. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL 
LAW § 1.5(a)(b), at 26 (2d ed. 1986) ("[R]etribution ... 'is suddenly being seen by 
thinkers of all political persuasions as perhaps the strongest ground .•. upon which to 
base a system of punishment.'") (quoting Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Ret-
ribution -An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781, 784); Charles E. 
Goodell, Preface to ANDREW VON HlRsCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PuNISHMENTS 
at xvi-xvii (1976). 
Although increasing deterrence was also listed among the Commission's goals, it 
was largely lost in the shuffle. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 908 (arguing that the 258-
box guideline system "does not seem to offer any deterrent advantage"); Lab, supra at 
46 (maintaining that the Guidelines "fail to address most of the crucial issues related to 
deterrence" and thus "hold little promise for enhancing crime deterrence"). That is not 
to say, though, that draconian drug sentencing guidelines that are enforced unbendingly 
hold absolutely no promise for at least making a potential drug offender think twice. As 
one infamous drug consumer illustrated, "[T]here was a giant billboard on the outskirts 
of Las Vegas, saying: 
DON'T GAMBLE WITH MARlruANA! 
IN NEVADA: POSSESSION- 20 YEARS 
SALE-LIFE! 
So I was not entirely at ease drifting around the casinos on this Saturday night with a 
car full of marijuana and head full of acid." HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LoATHING 
IN LAS VEGAS 42 (1971). 
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ing the length of the prison sentence that the offender serves. 47 Factors 
affecting a particular individual's blameworthiness apparently matter 
very little. Courts have therefore perceived the Guidelines as instructing 
them "to rest sentences on the offense committed, not upon the of-
fender. " 48 Hence, sentences under the Guidelines are generally less dis-
parate only in the sense that offenders who create similar amounts of 
harm receive sentences of a similar length. 
Though the Guidelines surely represent a shift in penal philosophy, 
scholars and judges have strongly criticized the perception that they 
constitute a shift to a purely harm-based penology. To begin with, a 
purely harm-based penology is at extreme tension with - and may vio-
late - the theory of punishment expounded by the Supreme Court less 
than five decades ago when it said the "punishment should fit the of-
fender and not merely the crime. " 49 Moreover, just deserts systems are 
premised on the idea of sentencing according to harm and culpability,50 
and, simply put, harm is different than culpability.51 
Harm is not a substitute for culpability and should never obscure 
its importance. Culpability, unlike harm, measures individual blame-
worthiness. It envelops various situation and offender characteristics, 
such as motivation and awareness, that matter just as much as harm.52 
47. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 908-09 (calling the move to a harm-based pe-
nology a shift from focusing on people to focusing on harms); Berlin, supra note 10, at 
196 ("Allowed less (or perhaps no) interest in rehabilitation, judges now focus on the 
offense for which a defendant is convicted rather than on the defendant's mental 
processes and individual situation."). 
48. United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United 
States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 507 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990); 
United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 
(1989). 
49. Wtlliams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). 
50. Andrew von Hirsch, a leading proponent of just deserts systems, explains that 
the seriousness of the crime "depends both on the harm done (or risked) by the act and 
on the degree of the actor's culpability." VON HIRscH, supra note 46, at 98-101. 
51. Professor Alschuler illuminates this idea well: "[O]ffenders who have pro-
duced comparable harms differ greatly in culpability. A system grounded on 'just 
deserts' need not - indeed should not - focus primarily upon harm." Alschuler, supra 
note 7, at 909; see also Berlin, supra note 10, at 197 ("[O]ffenders who have produced 
comparable harms can differ significantly in culpability."). 
Two basic examples demonstrate the importance of each independent factor. First, 
consider two men with identical mindsets who attempt to kill their brothers. If one suc-
ceeds and the other does not, the latter should receive a lighter sentence because he pro-
duced less harm. Now, consider two men who both succeed in killing their brothers, but 
imagine that one did it while being threatened with a knife. This man should receive a 
lighter sentence because he is less culpable. 
52. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 902 ("Situational and offender characteristics 
are as important as social harm in assessing sentences even from a 'just deserts' per-
spective . . . . "); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial 
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Consequently, one should never assume that culpability is approximated 
by social harm m~asured on a grid. As Judge Jon 0. Newman observed: 
This "incremental immorality" theory is lunacy .... This system is ludi-
crous because the number of grams a defendant happens to possess at the 
moment of arrest has nothing to do with her morality or culpability. Sim-
ilarly, a thief who commits a typical larceny has no idea how much he is 
stealing when he commits the crime, but is punished according to the 
amount of money involved, although his intent was to simply take 
whatever money he found.53 
Though courts are tempted to define their mission under the 
Guidelines as simply determining the amount of harm and plugging that 
figure into the grid, such a mission is fatally oversimplified.54 The 
Guidelines and their enabling statute "expressly require both judges and 
the Sentencing Commission to take account of offender characteris-
tics. "55 Even in the face of the harm-based specifics of the Guidelines, 
Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, I26 
U. PA. L. R.Ev. 550, 555-63 (1978) (arguing that the consideration of offender character-
istics is as essential to a just deserts approach as it is to a rehabilitative approach); 
Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TuL. L. R.Ev. I011, I047 (I991) 
("Harm alone is an insufficient measure of the punishment deserved" because offender 
characteristics are also relevant). 
53. Colloquy, Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Pro-
ceedings IOI YALE LJ. 2053, 2072-73 (1992) (comments of Judge Jon 0. Newman, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). 
54. For instance, Judge Pierre Leval has explained that the viability of the Guide-
lines absolutely depends on judges' power to consider offender characteristics and de-
part from the presumptive sentence when such characteristics present an unusual case. 
He continued, "If [harm was the only factor that determined sentences], a serious ques-
tion would arise whether the Guidelines must be struck down for failure to conform to 
the governing statute.'' United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 11 I8, 1120-2I 
(S.D.N.Y. I989). 
55. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 9IO (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(l) (1994)). The stat-
ute directs the Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing ranges "for each cate-
gory of offense involving each category of defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(I) (I994) 
(emphasis added); see also I8 U.S.C. § 3552 (I994) (requiring a pre-sentence examina-
tion of the defendant and authorizing additional psychological examination when appro-
priate); I8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(I) (I994) (directing the Guidelines and courts to consider 
both "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant"); 28 U.S.C. § 99I(b)(I)(C) (I994) (stating that sentences should "re-
flect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it re-
lates to the criminal justice process"). These sentiments are codified in § IBI.4 of the 
Guidelines, which reads, "In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline 
range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, 
without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct 
of the defendant .... " USSG § IBI.4 (1994). While one scholar has argued that this 
general provision is severely restricted by the specifics of the Guidelines, see Daniel J. 
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Dis-
cretion of Sentencers, IOI YALE LJ. 1681, 1716-18 (1992), the provision nevertheless 
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sentencing courts must strive to consider the defendant's culpability as 
well as the harm he has caused. 
B. Quantity-Based Drug Sentencing 
Like other specific provisions of the Guidelines, the drug-sentenc-
ing provisions focus on a proxy for harm, but here that proxy - quan-
tity - exposes an unfortunate avenue for investigative abuse and sen-
tence manipulation. Section 2Dl.1 of the Guidelines requires courts to 
sentence defendants convicted of drug offenses based on the total quan-
tity of drugs involved in the criminal transaction(s).56 The number of 
transactions that it takes to reach a given quantity is, in itself, immate-
rial. Moreover, the offender's role in the crime or risk to the community 
has little effect on the length of his sentence.57 For example, a dealer 
caught selling one kilogram of cocaine on a single occasion would re-
ceive essentially the same sentence as a street peddler who admitted to 
an undercover agent that he had sold twenty-five grams of cocaine a 
day while working a street corner for about seven weeks.58 
This focus on quantity creates the opportunity - and perhaps even 
a catalyst - for injustice and abuse.59 Government agents have virtually 
unfettered control over sting operations, and defendants usually receive 
longer sentences when government agents prolong sting operations be-
yond one or two transactions because each transaction increases the 
amount of drugs for which the defendant is criminally responsible. As 
the quantity of drugs grows, so grows the defendant's presumptive sen-
tence as it rises through the Guidelines' series of thresholds. Thus, gov-
ernment agents can control the sentences of those whom they investi-
gate, and, as more and more agents become trained in the operation of 
the Guidelines,60 they are doing just that. As a public defender in a met-
ropolitan area with heavy drug traffic explained: 
clearly states a policy of considering offender characteristics to which courts must give 
weight. 
56. See USSG § 2Dl.1 application note 6 (1994). 
57. See infra text accompanying note 78. 
58. See United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
59. See United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that the "mechanism of boosting 
sentences based on the cumulation of additional drug sales has the potential for abuse 
by police"); United States v. Monocchi, 836 F. Supp. 79, 88 (D. Conn. 1993) (same); 
United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D. Minn. 1990) (holding that cumula-
tive sentencing produces the "harsh, and most probably unintended, effect" of the po-
tential for sentence manipulation); see also cases cited supra note 12; infra text accom-
panying note 61. 
60. See United States v. Cabrera, 756 F. Supp. 134, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The 
existence of sentencing guidelines [is] well-known to police officers and federal agents 
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[O]ne of the things that I have noticed over the years is the police of-
ficers and agents are a little more savvy about these guidelines. All of a 
sudden rather than busting at two buys, they're busting after seven buys. 
What that does, is that just raises those guidelines, so those guys are bur-
ied .... I'm also aware of the fact that law enforcement agents say you 
need to get at least three buys off this guy because we want him to do X 
number of years; they will make a determination of the sentence before 
the man's ever even been charged.61 
The sentencing discretion that once resided in the chambers of judges 
now lies largely in the hands of government agents. Government agents 
can prolong their investigation as long as it talces to reach a threshold 
quantity of drugs that predetermines the defendant's sentence. Even less 
egregious tactics, such as making numerous purchases from the defend-
ant "in order to get to his source," can lead to similarly inflated quanti-
ties. This activity produces sentences that exceed the culpability of de-
fendants and is the essence of sentence manipulation. 62 
and the impact of specific evidence on the sentence a defendant will receive surely can-
not have escaped their notice."), vacated on other grounds sub nom. United States v. 
Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841 (1992); Marcia Chambers, 
Unwelcome Blurring of Boundaries, NA1L. LJ., Sept. 30, 1991, at 17 ("[T]he U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission now is training FBI [and other federal agents] in sentencing proce-
dures."). In her article, Chambers poses the disturbing question, "why do federal agents 
need to know about sentencing when their job is to investigate and arrest criminals?" 
Id. The answer, of course, rests in their desire to exert power over the punishment - as 
well as the apprehension - of the offender. 
61. Heaney, supra note 8, at 196 n.97, 197 n.99. Another public defender reported 
that some drug agents "'would move heaven and earth to get over fifty grams' which 
triggers a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(iii)." 
Id. at 196 n.97; see also infra note 91. 
62. Sentence manipulation also occurs in other settings where relevant facts are 
manipulated by government agents in order to overstate the defendant's culpability. See 
generally Deiss, supra note 11, at 424-26 (covering several scenarios). For example, 
government agents may, unbeknownst to the defendant, arrange a sale within one thou-
sand feet of a school, taking advantage of the "schoolyard statute." See United States v. 
Noble, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 27062 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 1993). Government agents may 
also, against the wishes of the defendant, attempt to involve firearms or automatic 
weapons in the transaction, which enhances considerably the defendant's sentence. See 
United States v. Overstreet, 5 F.3d 295, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United 
States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 706-09 (D.N.D. 1995) (departing downward when 
the government brought machine guns to a drug transaction in order to increase the de-
fendants' sentences from five to thirty years). 
In addition, sentence manipulation claims may arise in stings other than drug trans-
actions. The conduct of the government can produce the same dubious results in any 
sting that involves numerous transactions and when the amount involved in the transac-
tions determines the offender's sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 
425 (1st Cir. 1995) (involving stolen credit cards); United States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238 
(7th Cir. 1995) (involving counterfeit bills). 
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C. ls Sentence Manipulation a Legitimate Problem? 
One might argue that, barring improper inducement, defendants 
should always be punished for the total harm that they create. Even if 
the government keeps the sting going solely in order to reach some 
threshold amount, the defendants still voluntarily commit the crimes 
and should therefore be punished for them. 63 According to this view, as 
long as the defendant is willing to commit crimes, he has no right to 
complain when punished for his actions. Alternately stated, so long as a 
defendant is willing to commit crimes, his culpability - and desert of a 
larger sentence - grows with each crime he commits. 
However, this argument oversimplifies the notion of culpability 
and confuses sentence manipulation claims with sentence entrapment 
claims. Culpability depends both on what the defendant was willing to 
do and on his individual blameworthiness for doing it. Predisposition 
guides us only regarding the former. Therefore, predisposition is the test 
for entrapment claims,64 but it is irrelevant to sentence manipulation 
claims. 65 Sentence manipulation focuses on the individual blameworthi-
ness of the defendant and can be unjust and harmful for at least three 
reasons: (1) it creates an incentive for the government to perpetuate 
crime when its duty is to remove it from the streets; (2) it creates sen-
tencing disparity among similarly situated defendants; (3) it allows 
sentences disproportionate to the crimes committed. The first conse-
quence contravenes the very purpose of law enforcement, and the other 
two results violate the directives of the Guidelines.66 
1. Government-Perpetuated Crime 
The proper scope of a sting has limits. The government should 
never be in the business of perpetuating crime to increase punish-
ments. 67 Yet while some law enforcement agencies have contended in 
one case that they would never abuse their power in order to reach a 
63. This is essentially the view held by the Eleventh Circuit. See cases cited infra 
note 92. 
64. See WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL LAW§ 5.2(a) (2d ed. 
1992). It is also the focus of sentence entrapment claims. See supra note 27. 
65. See Guerra, supra note 26, at 181. 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
67. See Shennan v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (stating that the func-
tion of law enforcement does not include the manufacturing of crime); United States v. 
Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (explaining that the gov-
ernment's inducement in a sting should not create offenses "by exploiting the suscepti-
bility of a weak-minded person"). 
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threshold amount,68 others have admitted to doing just that in other 
cases.69 
It is irresponsible for the government to claim that it has the right 
to continue a sting so long as the defendant is a willing participant in 
the illegal activity. If we truly believe that dealing drugs is extremely 
harmful to society - and the length of sentences we impose on drug 
offenders suggests that we do70 - leaving a drug dealer on the street 
one more day than necessary should be regarded as intolerable. Under-
cover officers should be, and usually are, aware that the dealer whom 
they are investigating is supplying other customers.71 Thus, the harm to 
society from leaving a drug dealer on the street is likely to outweigh 
grossly any benefit received from imposing a longer sentence on him. 
Judge Friendly's analogy between drug dealing and other crimes makes 
this point very clearly: 
It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit government agents to in-
stigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other 
members of a gang of hoodlums. Governmental "investigation" involv-
ing participation in activities that result in injury to the rights of I.ts citi-
zens is a course that courts should be extremely reluctant to sanction. 
Prosecutors and their agents naturally tend to assign great weight to the 
societal interest in apprehending and convicting criminals; the danger is 
that they will assign too little to the rights of citizens to be free from 
government-induced criminality.72 
68. The government has argued on at least one occasion that two institutional fac-
tors prevent it from ever inflating sentences by delaying arrest. First, the undercover 
agent has a strong incentive to arrest the dealer to prevent him or her from supplying 
others besides the agent Second, law enforcement agencies have limited resources and 
"it is unlikely that an officer would make excessive purchases because the officer must 
account for every dollar expended to apprehend drug dealers." United States v. Barth, 
990 F.2d 422, 425 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993). 
69. In the Eleventh Circuit, the only circuit where sentence manipulation claims 
are barred per se, police officers have admitted openly making extra purchases to sub-
stantiate higher sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Edenfield, 995 F.2d 197, 199-200 
(11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 76 (1994); see also supra text accompanying 
note 61. 
70. According to a 1994 Department of Justice study, the average sentence for 
"low-level" drug offenders was, for example, higher than that for offenders convicted 
of kidnapping/hostage taking, robbery, assault, arson, fireanns, or racketeer-
ing/extortion. Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, The Disproportionate Imprisonment of 
Low-Level Drug Offenders, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 3, 4 (1994) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENDERS WITH MINIMAL CRIMINAL 
HISTORIES, (1994)). 
71. See Barth, 990 F.2d at 425 n.3. 
72. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973); see also United 
States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.D. 1995) ("Reverse stings present an in-
herent risk of abuse, and the courts must ensure that the government uses this powerful 
tool only to detect crime, not to create it."). But cf. PAUL MARcus, THE ENTRAPMENT 
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The government should not induce additional crime with immediate and 
substantial banns to society in the hopes that it may lock up its perpe-
trator for a longer period of time and prevent some undefined crime far 
off in the future. 
2. Sentencing Disparity 
Sentence manipulation creates sentencing disparity in violation of 
the key objective of the Guidelines73 because, when courts rigidly fol-
low section 2Dl.1 and sentence exclusively according to quantity, of-
fenders similar in culpability may receive vastly divergent sentences. 
This is because quantity does not always equal culpability.74 The num-
ber of times that a habitual drug user buys crack from an undercover 
agent has little do with his culpability.75 As one commentator explains, 
"The fact that A made numerous sales to an agent before arrest while 
B's agent arrested him after only one sale should not make a difference. 
Such arbitrarily determined sentences introduce disparity into a system 
intended to eliminate disparity. " 76 In short, a defendant's · sentence 
should not depend so heavily on the actions of federal agents. If two 
defendants were engaged in the same course of criminal action on the 
street, then they both deserve similar sentences. 
3. Disproportionate Sentences 
Sentence manipulation allows offenders to be punished dispropor-
tionately to the crimes they commit - regardless of whether the sever-
ity of a crime is measured according to hann, or culpability, or both. 
The reason for this is that - despite the fact that the Guidelines' stiff 
drug sentences were drafted with big-time dealers and typical stings in 
DEFENSE § 7.08 (2d ed. 1995) (claiming that the government is given more leeway in 
drug cases than in other crimes because of the difficulty of infiltrating and apprehending 
persons in drug rings). 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
74. See Berlin, supra note 10, at 197 (same); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Excessive 
Uniformity -And How to Fix It, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 169, 169-170 (1992) (con-
cluding that "[i]n effect, quantity-driven sentences mandate inequality by requiring that 
different cases be treated alike); Vitiello, supra note 52, at 1051 (arguing that quantity 
does not equal culpability); Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission's Drug Guide-
lines: Courier Cases Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 
63, 63 (1990) (same); see also supra text accompanying note 53. 
75. See Michael Katz & Caroline Durham, Department of Justice Low-Level Drug 
Offender Study: A Defense Perspective, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 28, 31 (1994) (arguing 
that quantity-based sentencing is unfair on just punishment grounds). 
76. Guerra, supra note 26, at 181. To make the hypothetical real, see United States 
v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1260-61 (D. Minn. 1990), discussed infra in note 164. 
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mind77 - section 2Dl.1 fails to distinguish between small-time users 
who are convicte<i of multiple transactions and the big-time dealers for 
whom they work.78 Couriers convicted of multiple transactions may be 
punished as severely as drug "kingpins" who are arrested after one 
large transaction. The investigator merely has to keep buying drugs 
from the courier until some threshold quantity is reached. 
Yet, as one court has noted, "[a]nyone familiar with narcotics dis-
tribution in our society would have to agree that those who deal in kilo-
gram quantities of narcotics are more culpable than . . . street ped-
dler[s]. "79 The former have a much larger influence on the drug trade 
and, hence, create more harm and are far more blameworthy for their 
actions.80 Thus, even if, after several transactions, a street peddler deals 
the same amount of drugs as a kingpin sells in a single transaction, the 
kingpin's crime is still worse in terms of both harm and culpability -
and the kingpin still deserves a longer sentence. To hold otherwise 
strains not only the Guidelines' policy of proportionality,81 but also the 
77. See infra notes 142-43. 
78. See Berlin, supra note 10, at 186. The "role-in-offense" provision of the 
Guidelines, § 3Bl.2, was somewhat aimed at mitigating this shortcoming, but the provi-
sion has proved largely ineffective. See United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 
1995) (noting extensive criticism); United States v. Batista-Segura, 1989 WL 125838, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 18, 1989) (The guidelines "give[] insufficient consideration to the 
significance in drug offenses of a participant's ... stake in the scope of a transaction, in 
view of the weight-driven system of grading such offenses."); Douglas A. Berman, The 
Second Circuit: Attributing Drug Quantities to Narcotics Offenders, 6 FED. SENTENCING 
REP. 247, 251 (1994) (questioning the wisdom of quantity-based sentences); Jon 0. 
Newman, Five Guideline Improvements, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 190, 190 (1993) (advo-
cating abandonment of the "excessive reliance on the drug quantity table" in favor of a 
system that will "correlate drug sentences primarily with the defendant's role in the 
drug distribution system"); Young, supra note 74, at 64 (pointing out the necessity of 
more fully considering the offender's role in the criminal enterprise). Young argues that 
the role-in-offense provision does little to remedy this injustice because the provision 
was not drafted with drug couriers in mind and, in any event, the Commission has in-
structed the courts that this provision should rarely be used and courts generally have 
followed this instruction. Id. at 64. 
79. United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd. in rele-
vant part sub nom. United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1995). 
80. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
81. See USSG, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1994). Further, insofar as sentence manipulation al-
lows offenders to receive sentences disproportionate to their culpability, sentence ma-
nipulation also unnecessarily exacerbates congestion in prisons - a problem courts are 
supposed to keep in mind under the Guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1994) (provid-
ing that the "guidelines ... shall be formulated to minimize the likelihood that the Fed-
eral prison population will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons"). In fact, drug 
sentencing is already the primary cause of the overcrowding of federal prisons. Depart-
ment of Justice statistics reveal that in 1992 a full 60% of all prisoners were incarcer-
ated because of drug offenses, and another study concluded that drug offenders alone 
are consuming three times more prison space than all other federal crimes combined. 
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dictates of the Supreme Court, who, as recently as 1983, reaffirmed the 
principle that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments dispropor-
tionate to the crime committed. 82 
II. COURTS' ANALYSIS OF SENTENCE MANIPULATION CLAIMS 
Though a few courts have not yet directly passed judgment on the 
viability of the sentence manipulation doctrine,83 two basic approaches 
to the doctrine have surfaced in the federal courts. The majority's ap-
proach is extremely restrictive and essentially never affords relief, while 
the minority's approach is more flexible and allows downward depar-
tures under broader circumstances. This Part sets forth these two ap-
proaches and evaluates their soundness and their effectiveness. Section 
II.A presents the majority's approach of analyzing sentence manipula-
tion claims under the outrageous government conduct test. It asserts that 
this test is too severe because it places an inordinate emphasis on police 
motives over the defendant's culpability. Section 11.B presents the mi-
nority's approach of departing downward under the Guidelines when 
the quantity of drugs the defendant bought or sold overstates his culpa-
bility - regardless of police motives - and maintains that this position 
more effectively allows for just punishment. 
A. Sentence Manipulation Only as Outrageous Government Conduct 
The majority of courts have taken a very restrictive view of sen-
tence manipulation claims that overemphasizes the importance of police 
motives over the defendant's culpability and analyzes these motives 
under an overly stringent test. This group of courts recognizes sentence 
manipulation only in the sense that it may constitute outrageous govern-
ment conduct - in essence, a violation of due process84 - that would 
See Miller & Freed, supra note 70, at 3; Eric Simon, The Impact of Drug-Law Sentenc-
ing on the Federal Prison Population, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 29, 30 (1993). 
82. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983); see also Thomas E. Baker & 
Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Length of a Criminal 
Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent to Precedent," 27 ARiz. L. 
REV. 25, 27-33 (1985) (gathering Supreme Court cases that affirm the principle of 
proportionality). 
83. 1\vo courts of appeals, for example, have abstained from deciding the validity 
of sentence manipulation and have held simply that even if there was such a doctrine, 
the facts before it did not constitute such a case. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 
44 F.3d 1271, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2011 (1995); United States v. 
Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 438 (3d Cir. 1994). 
84. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101. 
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require a downward departure.85 The Fourth,86 Seventh,87 Eighth,88 
Ninth89, and Eleventh90 Circuits hold this view.91 Within the group, only 
the Eleventh Circuit has concluded that sentence manipulation can 
never amount to outrageous government conduct;92 all other circuits 
have left that possibility open. 
85. Every court in the majority has failed to address the threshold question of 
whether the Sentencing Commission adequately considered the potential problem of 
sentence manipulation. Instead, each court has leaped immediately into its due process 
analysis. The answer to this inquiry is crucial because if a court finds that the Commis-
sion has not adequately considered the problem of sentence manipulation it is allowed 
to depart under a showing of far less than outrageous government conduct. See infra 
text accompanying notes 134-39. 
86. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1994). 
87. See, e.g., United States v. Messina, 55 F.3d 1241, 1256 (7th Cir. 1995). 
88. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 16 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1994). 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 824 (1996). 
90. See United States v. Edenfield, 995 F.2d 197, 199-200 (11th Cir. !993), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct 76 (1994); United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 672-73 (11th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1546 (1996). 
91. The First Circuit has taken a stance slightly more lenient than the majority po-
sition - if only in dicta. The court has asserted that it "has ample power," United 
States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Connell, 960 
F.2d 191, 195 (1st Cir. 1994)), to depart from the Guidelines in a case "where govern-
ment agents have improperly enlarged the scope or scale of the crime" and exclude the 
tainted transaction. United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425, 427 (1st Cir. 1995) (quot-
ing Montoya, 62 F.3d at 3). To depart, the court requires a showing of "extraordinary 
misconduct" on the part of the government, but, in defining this standard, claimed that 
"something less than a constitutional violation might" establish sentence manipulation. 
Egemonye, 62 F.3d at 427 (quoting Montoya, 62 F.3d at 3-4). 
However, in Egemonye, the First Circuit resisted an inviting opportunity to find 
such a violation - leaving one to wonder whether there is any significant practical dif-
ference between its stance and the majority's overly stringent outrageous government 
conduct requirement. In Egemonye, undercover agents sold stolen credit cards to the 
defendant on four occasions. The fourth sale of 40 credit cards was significantly larger 
than the defendant had either requested or could afford. It also more than doubled his 
base offense level. 62 F.3d at 426 (citing USSG §§ 2Fl.l(a), (b)(l)(h) (1994)). The 
agents allowed the defendant to put 25% down on the fourth purchase and then arrested 
him. 62 F.3d at 426. The court was concerned that this conduct may have been inspired 
by the government's admitted unhappiness with Egemonye's prior record and "lenient 
treatment." Nevertheless, it refused to exclude any of the four transactions because the 
government had valid investigatory purposes for continuing the investigation and -
even though predisposition should have been irrelevant, see supra text accompanying 
note 65, because the defendant was predisposed to commit the crimes. 62 F.3d at 427-
28. 
92. In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit held that one defendant's claim that "the 
government manipulated the transaction in order to get the mandatory minimum sen-
tence" was invalid as a matter of law because the defendant was predisposed to commit 
the crime. 954 F.2d at 672-73. The following year, in Edenfield, the court applied 
Williams and held that, although the sheriff - who had political enmity toward the de-
fendants - testified that he kept the sting going long enough to "support a mandatory 
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These courts' excessive deference to police discretion is exempli-
fied by the case of Michael Barth. Barth made seven sales of crack to 
an undercover police officer over a five-week period, even though the 
officer claimed that his "main purpose" after the fourth buy was to get 
to Barth's source.93 The seventh and final sale brought the aggregate 
amount of crack that Barth had sold to the officer to 50.4 grams,94 plac-
ing the aggregate over the "magic number": the fifty-gram threshold 
that carries the mandatory ten-year prison sentence95 - compared to 
only a five-year minimum sentence for 5 to 49.9 grams.96 Yet, even in 
the face of such dubious circumstances, the court still refused to impede 
police discretion and vacated the district court's reduced sentence.97 The 
court concluded, "[w]hile we are concerned with the government['s] 
conduct in this case, Barth has failed to demonstrate that the govern-
ment's conduct was outrageous .... " 98 
The outrageous government conduct defense stems from dicta in 
United States v. Russell,99 in which the Supreme Court stated, "we may 
some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct ~f law en-
forcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would ab-
solutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain 
a conviction .... " 100 Outrageous government conduct has proved ex-
tremely difficult to establish; it is therefore rarely a successful de-
minimum trafficking sentence under Georgia law," the defendants' sentence manipula-
tion claims were invalid as a matter of law. 995 F.2d at 199-201. 
Unfortunately, the court's position on sentence manipulation is legally flawed. It 
suffers from the infirmity of taking the defendant's predisposition into account. Predis-
position is irrelevant to sentence manipulation claims. See supra text accompanying 
notes 64-65. 
93. See United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 423 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. Minn. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 990 F.2d at 
422 (8th Cir. 1993). 
94. See 990 F.2d at 423. 
95. See 990 F.2d at 423; Barth, 788 F. Supp. at 1057; 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(A) 
(1994). 
96. See 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(B) (1994). 
97. See Barth, 990 F.2d at 423-25. 
98. 990 F.2d at 425. 
99. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
100. 411 U.S. at 431-32. The doctrine of outrageous government conduct is the 
surviving element of the objective entrapment defense. See United States v. Santana, 6 
F.3d I, 3 (!st Cir. 1993); MARCUS. supra note 72, § 7.03. Though the objective test has 
never been adopted by the Supreme Court, it is gaining support and is followed by sev-
eral states and by the Model Penal Code, see MODEL PENAL CODE (1985) § 2.13, and is 
favored by a majority of commentators. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 64, § 5.2(b); 
MARCUS, supra note 72, § 3.01. Since the Supreme Court's recognition of objective en-
trapment as a due process defense in extreme cases, the resulting doctrine of outrageous 
government conduct has been somewhat controversial and was most recently challenged 
before the Supreme Court in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). Neverthe-
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fense. 101 Hence, its application to sentence manipulation has been pre-
dictably stingy in affording relief. 
Courts that use the outrageous government conduct test generally 
have been reluctant to "subject isolated government conduct to a spe-
cial brand of scrutiny when its effect is felt in sentence . . . determina-
tion." 102 Moreover, courts have hesitated to question police decisions 
regarding sting operations that are, by their very nature, dangerous and 
manipulative.103 Thus, so long as the government has been able to pres-
ent a potentially legitimate law enforcement goal for prolonging its in-
vestigation, courts have refrained from finding outrageous government 
conduct and have upheld defendants' sentences. Such goals or motives 
have included: (1) going after more major players (suppliers or "king-
pins") in a drug ring;104 (2) the need to bolster the confidence of a 
weary suspect; 105 (3) the right to probe the extent of the defendant's 
criminality or extent of the drug conspiracy; 106 and ( 4) the need to pro-
cure evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 107 With so 
many potentially legitimate reasons for perpetuating investigattons, it is 
less, in Hampton, the Court upheld the validity of the doctrine by a vote of five to four. 
See 425 U.S. at 491-95. 
101. See Santana, 6 F.3d at 4. Perhaps the most famous triumph of the outrageous 
government conduct defense occurred in United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 
1978). In Twigg, DEA agents and informants initiated and completely managed an oper-
ation to manufacture illegal drugs with the willing, yet utterly passive defendant. See 
588 F.2d at 375-76. The court held that the police involvement in the crime was so 
overarching that it barred prosecution of the defendants. See 588 F.2d at 380-81. 
102. United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United 
States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining "to impose a rule that 
would require the government to come forward with a purpose or motivation, other than 
its responsibility to enforce the criminal laws of this country, as a justification for an 
extended investigation"). 
103. See Jones, 18 F.3d at 1155 (citing United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 
196 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
104. See United States v. Chavez-Vasquez, 64 F.3d 667, 1995 WL 492903, at *13 
(9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1995); United States v. Warren, 16 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1322 
(1994); United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D. Minn. 1990). 
105. See, e.g., Barth, 990 F.2d at 425 (maintaining that "an established drug 
dealer will not readily sell large quantities of drugs to a new customer and ... repeated 
buys are necessary to gain the dealer's confidence"). 
106. See Shephard, 4 F.3d at 649; United States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 123 (8th 
Cir. 1992). 
107. See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 824 (1996); Calva, 919 F.2d at 123. The First Circuit has expressed a similar 
concern in impeding police discretion in this area: "[T]he line is thin and blurred be-
tween such a dubious motive and a simple desire to be sure that a committed criminal is 
caught and tried for a substantial offense based on unshakable evidence." United States 
v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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not surprising that no court that views sentence manipulation as a spe-
cies of outrageous government conduct has allowed the doctrine to pro-
vide a successful partial defense to a quantity-based sentence.108 
However, courts examining sentence manipulation claims under 
the outrageous government conduct test incorrectly apply the test be-
cause sentence manipulation claims do not request the total relief that it 
is designed to afford.109 Outrageous government conduct violates consti-
tutional due process and "absolutely barfs] the government from invok-
ing the judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 110 Yet these courts 
claim that sentence manipulation, if found under their test of outrageous 
government conduct, only warrants a reduction in the defendant's sen-
tence. 111 This reasoning is logically incorrect; if sentence manipulation 
rises to the level of outrageous government conduct it must completely 
bar prosecution.112 Because a finding of sentence manipulation warrants 
only a downward departure, the outrageous government conduct test is 
108. One such court did find sentence manipulation where the government brought 
machine guns to a drug purchase where the defendants had only acquiesced to purchas-
ing handguns. The use of machine guns in a drug-trafficking crime carries a 30-year 
mandatory sentence while the similar use of a handgun carries a five-year minimum. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) (1994). The court found outrageous misconduct because "the 
only possible motive for[] this action was to increase the defendants' sentences from 
five to thirty years." United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 707-09 (D.N.D. 1995). 
109. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
110. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (emphasis added); see 
also United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1296 (8th Cir. 1984) (granting complete re-
lief on the basis of outrageous government conduct); United States v. 1\vigg, 588 F.2d 
373, 382 (3d Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1524 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (same). 
111. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct 824 (1996); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1993). 
112. Of all the courts to recognize sentence manipulation as a species of outra-
geous government conduct, the Seventh Circuit apparently is thus far the only one to 
identify this truism. See United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1256 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that if sentence 'manipulation were found it would "bar the government from 
invoking judicial processes" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The 
Fourth Circuit almost has recognized it, "not[ing its] skepticism as to whether the gov-
ernment could ever engage in conduct not outrageous enough so as to violate due pro-
cess to an extent warranting dismissal of the government's prosecution, yet outrageous 
enough to offend due process to an extent warranting a downward departure [in] a 
defendant's sentencing." See United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1994). 
The Fourth Circuit has, however, refused to take the next step to realize that sentence 
manipulation therefore cannot be analyzed under a complete defense doctrine. See 18 
F.3d at 1154. 
The Eleventh Circuit, while totally rejecting the doctrine of sentence manipulation, 
also follows this logic. The court only considers such claims under the due process 
analysis, which either bars prosecution or finds no violation at all. See United States v. 
Edenfield, 995 F.2d 197, 200 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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too stringent This explains why so many courts express deep concern 
with police conduct in these situations, but so rarely afford relief. 
Courts really should be asking whether they should recognize sentence 
manipulation - something less than outrageous government conduct -
as a valid partial defense warranting a downward departure in 
sentencing. 
The arguments against allowing sentence manipulation claims for 
fear of impeding police discretion are outweighed by the need to punish 
offenders according to their culpability as well as the harm they create. 
As an initial matter, it is unclear why courts should not apply a "special 
brand of scrutiny" to police decisions when they affect sentencing, 
rather than offense, determination.113 The integrity of our criminal jus-
tice system is based on the idea that the punishment must fit the 
crime.114 If police investigative tactics unjustly cause an offender's pun-
ishment to be more severe than he deserves, the defendant faces the 
prospect of spending time in prison during which he should have the 
right to be a member of society. Unless courts act to remedy. this dis-
proportionality, they abridge the offender's Eighth Amendment right to 
be free from excessive punishment.115 
Moreover, recognizing sentence manipulation claims does not im-
pede police discretion in any way; police officers suffer no negative 
consequences from their strategic decisions so long as the decisions 
plausibly reflect legitimate law enforcement goals - which they nearly 
always do.116 The partial defense of sentence manipulation simply ad-
justs an offender's sentence when police discretion operates in a way 
that produces quantities that overrepresent an offender's culpability. 
Under the sentence manipulation doctrine, law enforcement officers 
may still wait as long as they wish to arrest a suspect; 117 they just do 
not have the ability to ratchet up sentences by inviting the defendant to 
commit additional crimes. Guilty defendants are still convicted; their 
113. See United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994). 
114. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (noting that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires that the punishment must fit the crime committed). See generally 
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 327-41 (5th ed. 1989) (collecting essays that describe the impor-
tance of proportionality to the moral underpinnings of criminal justice). Proportionality 
is also an explicit objective of the Guidelines. See USSG, ch. 1 pt. A(3) (1994). 
115. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 286 (stating that the framers of the Eighth Amend-
ment sought to create a constitutional "right to be free from excessive punishments"). 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07. 
117. The doctrine of sentence manipulation therefore is not in tension with Su-
preme Court precedent that declined to find a "constitutional right to be arrested" once 
the police have sufficient evidence. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). 
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sentences are just required to reflect their culpability, not the agent's in-
vestigative tactics. 11s 
B. Sentence Manipulation as a Mitigating Circumstance Warranting 
Downward Departure 
The Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit, who 
generally see as many or more drug cases than any other district and 
circuit courts, 119 have taken a different approach to sentence manipula-
tion claims - one that is far more promising. The Southern District of 
New York, with the approval of the Second Circuit, has departed down-
ward in cases in which the "quantity/time factor," the amount of drugs 
the defendant bought or sold over the period of time in question, did 
not accurately reflect the culpability of the defendant.120 This method of 
departing has been the most accommodating treatment of sentence ma-
nipulation claims that defendants have received in any court. More im-
portantly, it allows for just punishment under the Guidelines more ef-
fectively than does the majority's approach. 
The case of United States v. Genao121 illustrates this approach. 
Pedro Lara, one of the defendants, was a relatively minor member of a 
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994) (listing the factors to be considered in impos-
ing sentences, all of which focus on the defendant, or society, or both, and none of 
which focuses on the government's motives - legitimate or not); United States v. 
Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd. in relevant part sub nom. United 
States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1995) (departing downward to ensure that defendants 
were punished commensurately with their culpability); Berlin, supra note 27, at 187 
("[G]overnment activity should not affect an offender's sentence when an agent's ac-
tions result in a sentence incommensurate with the offender's actual mens rea or culpa-
bility."); Guerra, supra note 26, at 182 (arguing that "[t]he courts should focus not on 
the motives of the government but on imposing punishment commensurate with the of-
fender's level of culpability"). 
119. In 1991, for example, the Second Circuit heard 2023 narcotics or controlled 
substance cases - 40% of its total docket. This percentage exceeded the drug-related 
portion of every other circuit court's docket. See ADMINISTRATIVE OmCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 58-61 (1991). The Southern 
District of New York heard 639 such cases, the fourth highest total among the 95 fed-
eral district courts. See id. 
120. See United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1995); Genao, 831 F. 
Supp. at 251-52; United States v. Giles, 768 F. Supp. 101, 103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), 
affd., 953 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 949 (1992). The District of 
Minnesota - which sits in the first state to establish a sentencing commission and is 
therefore presumably more informed than most district courts regarding the flaws in 
sentencing guidelines - also has departed downward on similar grounds. See United 
States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1260-61 (D. Minn. 1990) (departing); Michael 
Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Their Effects, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND 
ITS GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 18-20 (describing Minnesota's guidelines experience). 
121. 831 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd. in relevant part sub nom. United 
States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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large drug dealing operation. Lara distributed crack - never more than 
twenty-five grams at a time - to federal agents on several occasions 
over seven months. By the time he was arrested and convicted, he had 
participated in the distribution of 7 .3 kilograms of crack and, based on 
the government's presentence report, faced nineteen years and seven 
months in prison with no chance for parole. 122 
The court justifiably found this predicament "impossible to be-
lieve" 123 and departed from the Guidelines' recommended sentence in 
three steps. First, the court noted that it was empowered to depart if 
"there exists a[] . . . mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission 
in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different 
from that described." 124 Second, the court found that in this case, Lara's 
culpability was overstated by the Guidelines' excessive reliance on 
quantity irrespective of time. 125 Third, the court departed because it 
found that the Sentencing Commission had in fact not adequately taken 
this mitigating circumstance into consideration.126 Therefore, .the court 
departed and sentenced Lara to ten years in prison. 127 The Second Cir-
cuit later affirmed the court's reasoning and judgment. 128 
122. 831 F. Supp. at 247-49. 
123. 831 F. Supp. at 248. 
124. 831 F. Supp. at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
125. See 831 F. Supp. at 248, 251-52. 
126. See 831 F. Supp. at 249. Significantly, the court avoided all allegations of po-
lice misconduct, presumably because it deemed the police's motives somewhat beside 
the point - surely the government had a legitimate motive in seeking to investigate and 
arrest more major players in Lara's drug operation. Further, the court did not examine 
the defendant's predisposition to engage in criminal activity. The court did, however, 
pay special attention to the defendant's level of culpability. Instead of rigidly applying 
the Guidelines to reach an absurd result, the court thought it crucial that Lara's sentence 
reflect the true extent of his criminal conduct. See 831 F. Supp. at 253-54. 
127. See 831 F. Supp. at 252-53. 
128. See United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit 
made one minor adjustment to the District Court's analysis. It saw Application Note 16 
(effective Nov. 1, 1993) as additional evidence that the Sentencing Commission had not 
adequately considered the "quantity/time factor" before 1993. "That amendment recog-
nizes that under some circumstances . . . 'the quantity of the controlled substance for 
which the defendant is held accountable under§ IBI.3 (Relevant Conduct) may over-
represent the defendant's culpability in the criminal activity.' " 47 F.3d at 66 (quoting 
USSG § 2Dl.1 application note 16 (1994)). Yet in making this adjustment the court de-
clined to hold that this amendment constituted adequate consideration of the "quan-
tity/time factor." The court therefore left open the possibility of departing downward for 
sentence manipulation-type conduct occurring after 1993. See 41 F.3d at 66. 
Note 16 since has been construed to apply to a situation significantly different 
from sentence manipulation, demonstrating that the Sentencing Commission did not 
consider the "quantity/time factor" in drafting Note 16. The Ninth Circuit explained 
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These courts are on the right track. They are the only courts, save 
the District of Minnesota,129 to address the necessary, threshold question 
of a sentence manipulation claim: whether the Sentencing Commission 
has considered adequately the potential for sentence manipulation. This 
difference in inquiring into the Commission's understanding, or lack 
thereof, of sentence manipulation scenarios explains why these courts 
have departed downward in cases similar to those in which other courts 
reluctantly have refused to depart. The answer to this inquiry deter-
mines the level of proof the defendant must establish. 
If courts find that the Commission has considered adequately this 
potential problem, it seems that only a constitutional violation will jus-
tify a departure from the Guidelines.130 However, if courts find - as 
these courts have - that the Commission has not considered adequately 
the problem, the standard may be significantly lower. In this case, the 
defendant must only establish that a downward departure complies with 
the policies of the Guidelines.131 Hence, if these courts are correct in 
finding that the Commission has not considered adequately tqis poten-
tial problem, their analysis appears sound, both in terms of following 
the dictates of the Guidelines and in terms of sentencing according to 
the defendant's culpability. 
ill. LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO SENTENCE MANIPULATION 
This Part proposes alternative legal solutions for recognizing sen-
tence manipulation as a viable and effective partial defense. Section 
ill.A elaborates on the Second Circuit's reasoning132 and maintains that 
sentence manipulation is a mitigating circumstance that provides courts 
with a sound legal basis under which to depart downward by analogy to 
that Note 16 was adopted to address the problem that occurs when defendants, under 
the relevant conduct provision, are sometimes "held 'accountable' for large amounts of 
controlled substance with which he may have little personal contact or involvement." 
United States v. Pinto, 48 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 125 (1995). Thus the court held that the district court correctly refused to apply 
Note 16 where "the defendants were only charged at a level reflecting drugs that they 
actually transported or handled." 48 F.3d at 388. Because in virtually all sentence ma-
nipulation claims the defendant has "transported or handled" the drugs, Note 16 cannot 
apply to sentence manipulation cases. 
129. See United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 1992), va-
cated, 990 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 
(D. Minn. 1990). 
130. Recall, though, that none of the courts requiring a constitutional violation for 
downward departure has found that the Commission adequately considered the potential 
for sentence manipulation. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
131. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553-3553(b) (1994). 
132. See supra section II.B. 
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the Guidelines. In the alternative, section ll.B proposes amending the 
Guidelines to limit the quantity of drugs that constitutes "relevant con-
duct" to the amount bought or sold in any thirty-day period - or 
shorter if the government has continued the investigation without a le-
gitimate law enforcement goal. Section ill.C argues that either of these 
solutions would better achieve the Guidelines' goals of punishing ac-
cording to culpability and minimizing sentence disparity, while not im- . 
pairing any legitimate police practices. 
A. Departing Under the Guidelines 
Courts have the ability to depart downward under the Guidelines 
when the government's actions in conducting a sting do not rise to a 
constitutional violation, yet still adversely affect an offender's sen-
tence.133 This method is available because sentence manipulation consti-
tutes a mitigating circumstance that was not considered adequately by 
the Sentencing Commission. When the defendant can show that the 
government's conduct - whether or not it was aimed at legitimate law 
enforcement goals - created a situation in which the quantity of drugs 
overstates his culpability, courts should depart downward to see that the 
defendant's sentence is commensurate with those of other defendants 
who have engaged in a similar course of criminal conduct. 
1. The Basis for Departure 
The Sentencing Commission intended each guideline to serve as a 
"heartland" to cover "a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that 
each guideline describes." 134 Therefore, courts may depart downward 
from the Guidelines when they find a "mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described." 135 Because the Guidelines were 
designed to deal with typical cases - and because the Guidelines are 
admittedly something of a "work-in-progress" 136 - the Sentencing 
133. See infra text accompanying notes 134-43. 
134. USSG ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (1994). 
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). The Supreme Court explained the process for 
such a departure: "If a factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines, the court must, after 
considering the 'structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the 
Guidelines taken as a whole,' ... decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of 
the Guideline's heartland." Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996) (quot-
ing United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
136. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(2) (1994) ("The Commission emphasizes, however, 
that it views the guideline-writing process as evolutionary. It expects, and the governing 
2412 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2385 
Commission intended this provision to be construed liberally.137 As the 
Second Circuit has highlighted, "[E]ven adequate consideration of a 
factor in general would not preclude its use as a ground for a departure 
if the factor was present in a particular case 'to a degree' not adequately 
considered." 138 In short, courts should never blush to depart in the unu-
sual case; such departures are essential for the vitality of the Guidelines 
system.139 
statute anticipates, that continuing research, experience, and analysis will result in modi-
fications and revisions to the guidelines through submission of amendments to Con-
gress."); Kennedy, supra note 30, at 272 ("It was always understood that the guideline 
system would be evolutionary in nature."); Amy Levin Weil, In Partial Defense of Sen-
tencing Entrapment, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 172, 175 (1995) ("The sentencing guide-
lines were intended to be a work in progress - designed to be revised and improved 
upon through amendment."). 
In fact, "[s]ince the Guidelines took effect in 1987, the Commission has fine-tuned 
them with several hundred amendments." Schulhofer, supra note 74, at 171. 
137. See USSG ch. 1, part A(4)(b) (1994) (With exceptions not applicable here, 
"the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether o.r not men-
tioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an 
unusual case."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1988) (instructing the Commission 
to establish policies that "avoid[] unwarranted sentence disparities ... while maintain-
ing sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigat-
ing or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sen-
tencing practices"); Freed, supra note 55, at 1745 ("[The Commission) expressly 
invited judges to depart in unusual cases."). But cf. id. at 1744-45 (arguing that the 
Commission sent courts "mixed messages" about departures by combining its state-
ments advocating flexibility in the Guidelines' Introduction with strict language in the 
Guidelines themselves). 
138. United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b) (1988)). The Second Circuit has stressed the importance of departure in other 
cases as well. For example, in United States v. Monk, the district court thought it was 
ridiculous that the defendant had to be sentenced to twelve years in prison for possess-
ing a relatively modest amount of crack, but felt that it lacked any legal basis for depar-
ture and thus felt compelled to impose the sentence. The Second Circuit, however, re-
manded the case because it felt that "[t]he record raise[d) the disturbing possibility that 
the sentencing judge failed to appreciate his authority to depart under § 3553(b)." IS 
F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1994). 
139. See Schulhofer, supra note 74, at 171; see also supra note 54. In his article, 
Professor Schulhofer notes the disturbing trend toward an "unduly sparing use of the 
departure power" - among the causes of which is overly stringent appellate review -
and argues that this threatens the fairness and effectiveness of the Guidelines. 
Schulhofer, supra note 74, at 171. The Supreme Court recently echoed these concerns 
when it emphasized the fact that "[a) district court's decision to depart from the Guide-
lines ... will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional 
exercise of discretion by the sentencing court." Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046. Thus, the 
Court held, appellate courts should review departures only for abuse of discretion. 116 
S. Ct. at 2047-48. 
There is, of course, the worry that if some courts depart and others do not, some 
measure of disparity will be reintroduced into the Guidelines' system. However, this 
should not prevent courts from departing when it truly is necessary; it merely should 
encourage all courts to be consistent. If, after careful consideration, the circuits still do 
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Nothing in the Guidelines' legislative history or policy statements 
indicates that the Commission considered the possibility of sentence 
manipulation arising from the operation of quantity-based guidelines in 
sting cases.140 No court of appeals has suggested otherwise. Even courts 
of appeals that have overturned district court downward departures 
based on the Commission's inadequate consideration of sentence manip-
ulation have failed to assert that the Commission adequately considered 
the problem.141 It seems most likely that the Commission's stiff "heart-
land" drug sentencing guidelines are aimed at big-time drug dealers142 
not agree on the appropriateness of a departure, the Sentencing Commission is likely to 
adopt an amendment or application note to eliminate the disparity. 
140. See United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), ajfd. in 
relevant part sub nom. United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Giles, 768 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Saul M. Pilchen, The Underside of Un-
dercover Operations, LEGAL TIMES, July 15, 1991, at 39. 
Two amendments were proposed in 1992 to address the problem of sentence ma-
nipulation, but proposed amendments do not constitute "adequate consideratjon" by the 
Commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). The first amendment sought to limit the 
relevant conduct in any offense involving a number of transactions to the largest trans-
action; the second sought to limit the relevant conduct in any offense involving a num-
ber of transactions to the total amount from any 30-day period. 57 Fed. Reg. 62,832, 
62,837 (proposed Dec. 31, 1992). The Commission noted, "[o]ther than in extremely 
large scale cases, the use of such a 'snapshot' arguably provides a more reliable method 
of distinguishing larger from smaller scale drug traffickers." Id. 
However, the Commission neither addressed the proposals at its public hearings of 
March, 1993, nor submitted them to Congress when it proposed amendments to the 
Guidelines in May, 1993. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMN., PuBLIC HEARINGS ON PROPOSED 
GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS (Mar. 22, 1993); 58 Fed. Reg. 27, 148 (May 6, 1993). Further, 
courts are not allowed to consider these, or any other, proposed amendments in decid-
ing whether the Sentencing Commission has considered the problem adequately. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (stating that district courts are to consider "only the sentencing 
guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis-
sion."); Genao, 831 F. Supp. at 248, 250 (following this dictate and citing several 
courts of appeals to explicitly reiterate its importance). Such a practice, it is argued, 
would lend too much importance to congressional inaction. See Scripps-Howard Radio 
v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942) (arguing that Congress acts only by affirmatively passing 
laws); Genao, 831 F. Supp. at 251 ("[T]he failure of the Sentencing Commission to 
amend the Guidelines as proposed is not indicative of any intent or consideration on its 
part."); 133 CONG. REc. Sl6,644 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) 
(explaining that the intent of the Commission should only be divined from "the official 
pronouncements of the Commission"). 
141. See United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1993) (vacating the 
district court's sentence without addressing its finding that the "commission ha[d] failed 
to adequately consider the terrifying capacity for escalation of a defendant's sentence 
based on the investigating officer's determination of when to make an arrest"); see also 
United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1152-55 (4th Cir. 1994) (neglecting to address ap-
pellants' claim that the Sentencing Commission failed to consider the theory of sentence 
manipulation adequately). 
142. Senator Bob Graham, for instance, described the stereotypical drug dealer 
that the Guidelines' harsh sentences were out to punish: "They live in the fast lane. 
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who are busted in typical sting operations after a couple of buys.143 
Therefore, sentence manipulation scenarios, which usually involve low-
level couriers and several transactions, provide the precise type of unu-
sual circumstance that warrants a departure from the Guidelines' heart-
land categories. 
2. The Method of Departure 
Once courts understand that the unusual circumstance of sentence 
manipulation provides a sound basis for departure, courts need a 
method to formulate a proper sentence. The best way to formulate a 
proper departing sentence with sound reasoning is to draw an analogy 
from the Guidelines.144 The best analogy that can be drawn to the prob-
lem of sentence manipulation is by comparing it to the "incomplete" or 
"partial" sentences recognized in several other sections of the Guide-
lines.145 In keeping with this theme, courts may view sentence manipu-
They drive big cars - usually several - like BMWs and Mercedeses .... They like 
gold. Big gold chains and big gold diamond rings .... They spend most of their money 
on themselves and their women." 134 CONG. REc. S3127 (1988) (Statement of Sen. 
Graham (quoting Lt W.B. Hodges, Jacksonville, Florida narcotics division)). 
143. The average sting operation involves one or two buys followed by an arrest. 
See Genao, 831 F. Supp. at 248; see also Heaney, supra note 8, at 197 n.99 (stating that 
before the advent of the Guidelines most busts were made after two buys). 
144. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (1994) (pointing out that the Commission rec-
ommends "departure by analogy" if courts are to depart from certain sections); United 
States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1012 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that district courts properly 
depart by analogy to the Guidelines); United States v. Pearson, 911 F.2d 186, 190-91 
(9th Cir. 1990) ("Any departure should be guided by analogy to the guidelines."); cf. 
Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045 (1996) (holding that departures should 
consider "structure and theory" of the Guidelines). 
145. The theory of "incomplete defense" is entrenched firmly in the guidelines. 
See Weil, supra note 136, at 174. Weil states that: 
Although early on an argument could have been made that a sentencing 
court should be prohibited from departing on the basis of an "incomplete de-
fense," it is too late in the game to argue this point convincingly. Even the origi-
nal version of the guidelines allowed for downward departures where there was 
proof of other "incomplete defenses": § 5K2.10 provides for a departure based 
on the "victim's conduct" in a situation amounting to something less than "self-
defense"; § 5K2.12 allows for a departure based on "coercion and duress" under 
circumstances not amounting to a complete defense of coercion or duress; and 
§ 5K2.13 permits a departure based on "diminished capacity" in a situation 
where an insanity defense would not be available. Hence, the Sentencing Com-
mission has made it clear that an "incomplete defense" can provide a basis for a 
departure from the guidelines. 
Id. Weil also points out that application note 17 to§ 2Dl.l - allowing a downward de-
parture when the government sold drugs to the defendant at an artificially low price -
is cut out of this same mold. It is an incomplete entrapment defense. See id. at 174-75. 
The idea of incomplete or partial defenses also has been recognized by Minnesota, 
the first state to adopt guidelines, as a necessary part of a guideline scheme. The Minne-
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lation as a partial defense amounting to partially outrageous government 
conduct. In other words, sentence manipulation is government conduct 
that is not outrageous enough to offend due process principles, but that 
nevertheless demonstrates an excessive influence in the crime(s) such 
that it mitigates an offender's culpability under the Guidelines. 
At first glance, the theory of "partially outrageous" government 
conduct may seem a bit unusual or linguistically contradictory.146 How-
ever, an examination of the policy behind the outrageous government 
conduct doctrine reveals that recognizing a lesser form of it as a partial 
defense is entirely consistent with criminal law due process principles. 
The outrageous government conduct doctrine reflects a principle of fun-
damental fairness - a principle that says that government over-
involvement in crime mitigates an offender's culpability.147 Courts 
therefore refuse to convict defendants when the government's conduct 
is "not aimed at facilitating discovery or suppression of ongoing illicit 
dealings ... [but r]ather ... [is] aimed at creating new crimes for the 
sake of bringing criminal charges against [the defendant] ..... " 148 The 
government admittedly acts less than outrageously when it simply pro-
longs an existing investigation, but it is still unfair to the defendant to 
make the length of his sentence turn on, for example, how long it takes 
the government to apprehend the other drug dealers that he knows.149 
sota Sentencing Guidelines provide for a downward departure when "[o]ther substantial 
grounds exist which tend to excuse or mitigate the offender's culpability, although not 
amounting to a defense." MINN. SENT. GUIDELINES II.D.103(2)(a)(5) (1995). 
146. This theory may seem especially problematic to a court that believes that it 
must test each transaction for outrageous government conduct and, depending on the re-
sult, either wholly include or wholly exclude that transaction from the defendant's sen-
tencing calculus. But such a method would misapply the idea of partially outrageous 
government conduct. Partially outrageous government conduct warrants a reduced sen-
tence from each illegal transaction consummate with the level of governmental over-
involvement in that particular transaction. 
147. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1297 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 379 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
148. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1297. 
149. This formula for a partial reduction of a defendant's sentence also is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's other line of due process, pre-indictment misconduct 
cases, United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), and United States v. Lovasco, 431 
U.S. 783 (1977). Lovasco precludes the government from prosecuting a case when (1) it 
has delayed indictment in order to gain a tactical advantage, and (2) the defendant has 
suffered prejudice. 431 U.S. at 795-96. When the government continues an investigation 
after it has decided to prosecute and after it can establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and in so doing increases the defendant's sentence, the government acts - at 
least in part - to gain a tactical advantage, see 431 U.S. at 792-95, and obviously 
prejudices the defendant. Under guidelines that fail to account for this situation, a re-
duced sentence seems thoroughly appropriate. 
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The idea of a partial defense based on the due process doctrine is 
new simply because the Guidelines are new. Before the Guidelines, 
courts could use their discretion to make sure an offender's sentence 
matched his true level of culpability.150 But today, under section 201.1 
of the Guidelines, courts must sentence offenders almost exclusively ac-
cording to the quantity of drugs involved in his crimes.151 Courts need 
the partial defense of sentence manipulation to depart from the Guide-
lines when inequities in sentencing flow from this harm-based sentenc-
ing provision. 
Such a rule is also consistent with other provisions and policies in 
the Guidelines. It "limit[s] the significance of the formal charging deci-
sion and ... prevent[s] multiple punishment for substantially identical 
offense conduct." 152 This is consistent with the Guidelines' desire to 
prevent disproportionate punishment for a single course of conduct, 153 
like being a weekly drug courier. Sentence manipulation also reduces 
the harshness of tough sentences for those offenders without a signifi-
cant role in the criminal enterprise.154 This is consistent with t4e Guide-
lines' desire to make drug sentences correlate with the offender's level 
of culpability155 as demonstrated by his role in the offense.156 Lastly, 
such a rule considers offender characteristics that are often lost in the 
rigid calculations of the Guidelines, but that are supposed to be consid-
ered by courts.157 Situation and offender characteristics, such as the 
150. See United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994). 
151. See USSG § 2Dl.1 (1994). 
152. USSG ch. 3, pt. D, Introductory Commentary (1994). 
153. See USSG ch. 3, pt. D, Introductory Commentary (1994); United States v. 
Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. Minn. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 990 F.2d 
422 (8th Cir. 1993). 
154. Sentence manipulation defenses seek to differentiate, for example, between 
the courier who sells ten grams of crack ten times and the kingpin who sells 100 grams 
once. See supra section I.C.3. 
155. See supra note 78. 
156. Cf. USSG §§ 3Bl.1 - .2 (1994) (listing the Guidelines role-in-offense catego-
ries); United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1212 (2d Cir. 1995) (highlighting the im-
portance of the Guidelines role-in-offense categories), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1056 
(1996); Young, supra note 74, at 64 {pointing out the necessity of giving more weight 
to the offender's role in the offense under the Guidelines). 
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(l) (1994) (instructing the Sentencing Commission to 
establish sentencing ranges "for each category of offense involving each category of 
defendant"); USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1994) (expressing the importance of offender char-
acteristics to a workable system of guidelines); USSG § 5K2.0 (1994) (stating that of-
fender characteristics that are present in an unusual degree - distinguishing the case 
from "heartland" cases - may provide grounds for departure). The Supreme Court 
also has stated emphatically that courts always should consider offender characteristics. 
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("[P]unishment should fit the of-
fender and not merely the crime."). 
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defendant's motivation in committing crimes or his level of knowledge 
about the criminal enterprise, matter as much as harm in a just deserts 
punishment scheme like the Guidelines.158 
B. Amending the Guidelines 
As an alternative to having courts recognize sentence manipulation 
claims under the "not adequately considered" provision of the Guide-
lines, the Commission could amend section 2Dl.1 to deal explicitly 
with the problem. Adding an application note to section 2D 1.1 would, 
at a minimum, ensure that federal courts apply the same rule to sen-
tence manipulation claims. Indeed, amending the Guidelines represents 
the same sensible solution that the Commission adopted to deal with the 
similar problems of sentence entrapment159 and the injustice that can oc-
cur when the amount of drugs for which the offender is "accountable" 
overstates his culpability. 160 Thus, in this spirit of the Guidelines as a 
"work-in-progress,"161 this Note proposes the following application 
note to section 2D 1.1: 
When the offense involved a number of transactions over a period of 
time of more than thirty days, the offense level is to be limited by the 
amount with which the defendant was involved in any thirty-day period, 
using the thirty-day period that results in the greatest offense level. In ad-
dition, if the court finds that the government continued to conduct trans-
actions within the relevant thirty-day period while serving no legitimate 
law enforcement goal, the transactions that served no legitimate law en-
forcement goal are to be excluded from the offense level calculation.162 
This proposal is extremely reasonable. It is hard to imagine a situation 
in which an offender's culpability could not be fairly determined by a 
thirty-day "snapshot." 163 It is simply unjust to allow two offenders who 
are both low-level drug couriers to be sentenced to grossly disparate 
158. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 902. 
159. See USSG § 2Dl.1, application notes 12 and 15 (1994) (adopted Nov. 1, 
1993) (discussed supra in note 27). 
160. See USSG § 2Dl.1, application note 16 (1994) (adopted Nov. l, 1993) (dis-
cussed supra in note 128). 
161. See supra note 136. 
162. This proposed amendment, and much of its language, is adopted partially 
from a proposed amendment from 1992 that the Commission declined to pass on to 
Congress. See supra note 140. 
163. Perhaps such an exceptional situation would occur if a major drug dealer sold 
huge amounts of drugs to smaller dealers, but always at intervals more than one month 
apart. Here, the major dealer's infrequent sales might serve to underrepresent his culpa-
bility as a kingpin in the drug trade whose drugs were constantly dealt - just not by 
him. In a rare situation like this, the court could depart upward to craft a more just 
sentence. 
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sentences just because one was investigated for two weeks and the 
other for two months. 
There are several advantages to this application note. First, it does 
not inhibit or deter legitimate police behavior. Because the thirty-day 
period that produces the largest amount of drugs is used for offense 
level calculations, federal agents may still make several buys in order to 
bolster the confidence of a weary suspect, examine the full depths of a 
drug ring's criminality, and be sure that they have airtight evidence for 
trial. Indeed, federal agents are not punished in any way for continuing 
investigations as long as they deem necessary to apprehend all of their 
suspects. 164 The amendment merely provides the missing incentive to 
arrest a criminal when no legitimate reasons remain for continuing the 
investigation, thereby ensuring that defendants' culpability will not be 
overrepresented by the police's discretionary decisions over which de-
fendants have no controI.165 
Second, the "thirty-day" provision, without a limit on the number 
of relevant transactions within the period, still distinguishes th~ frequent 
dealer from the offender who conducts single or occasional transactions, 
the former presumably being more culpable.166 Third, the thirty-day pro-
vision avoids the problem of "structuring," performing several small 
transactions in lieu of one large transaction, that might occur under a 
rule limiting the number of transactions that could be taken into consid-
eration.167 The total amount of drugs that the drug dealer sells is still the 
relevant quantity for calculating purposes. Fourth, the amendment's fi-
nal sentence ensures that the government does not act as if it always has 
164. This amendment would produce results similar to the court's in United States 
v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Minn. 1990). In Floyd, the government continued to 
purchase drugs from the defendant long after she ceased to be the target of the investi-
gation. The court saw nothing wrong with the government's decision to pursue its in-
vestigation in this fashion (i.e., through the defendant) but refused to punish the defend-
ant for it and, therefore, departed downward from the Guidelines because the 
defendant's "role clearly was exaggerated by the investigative methods in this case." 
Floyd, 738 F. Supp. at 1260-61. 
165. See Berlin, supra note 27, at 187 (arguing that "government activity should 
not affect an offender's sentence when an agent's actions result in a sentence incom-
mensurate with the offender's actual mens rea or culpability"). Jn this sense, the 30-day 
cutoff could be seen as marking the point when the government's tactics normally begin 
to overwhelm any discernable gradations in culpability. 
166. See United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (support-
ing this distinction), affd. in relevant part sub nom. United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
167. See United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting the 
government's concern that a rule limiting the number of transactions that a court could 
consider would "unduly reward[] those drug dealers who are savvy enough to 'go slow' 
with new customers"). 
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a "free month" with which to play. Once the government has sufficient 
evidence to convict the suspect, and no other legitimate law enforce-
ment goals remain in the investigation, the government should arrest the 
suspect.168 
Finally, this application note would provide a bright-line rule. 
Bright-line rules are applied easily by courts and save courts time. This 
rule basically would cover all sentence manipulation claims. Yet, under 
the "not adequately considered" savings clause, courts would still re-
tain the ability to depart further if it found that a thirty-day snapshot 
still overrepresented the defendant's culpability.169 Courts could find, for 
example, that the Commission had not considered problems posed 
before it "to a[n adequate] degree." On the other hand, courts would 
still retain the ability to depart upward when they found an aggravating 
circumstance made a thirty-day snapshot an inadequate representation 
of the defendant's culpability. Such departures, whether upward or 
downward, would prove extremely rare, though, given the high degree 
of consideration that such an amendment would probably sign~fy. 
C. The Benefits of a Viable Sentence Manipulation Doctrine 
The most basic policy of the Guidelines, as with nearly every just 
deserts system of criminal punishment, is to punish according to some 
combination of culpability and harm. Yet as courts and the Commission 
have begun to recognize, 170 drug quantity does not always equal culpa-
bility or even harm. Strictly implementing section 2Dl.1 of the Guide-
lines can sometimes produce incentives and outcomes that frustrate the 
objectives and policies of the Guidelines. Hence, courts and the Com-
mission, 171 by recognizing the doctrine of sentence manipulation, would 
advance the major objectives of the Guidelines far more effectively than 
the current framework does. 
168. The import of this provision is already accepted by most courts to directly 
address the sentence manipulation issue. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 
3 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that "where government agents have improperly enlarged 
the scope or scale of the crime, the sentencing court" should exclude that tainted trans-
action(s)); United States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238, 240 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Sentencing manip-
ulation occurs when the government engages in improper conduct that has the effect of 
increasing a defendant's sentence."). 
169. For a discussion of how this general process would work, see supra section 
ID.A. 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 140. 
171. The benefits described in this section pertain with equal force whether the 
courts recognize sentence manipulation claims under the current Guidelines structure or 
the Commission amends the Guidelines. See supra sections III.A, m.B (respectively). 
This obviously reflects this Note's assumption that courts should depart downward in a 
manner similar to that of the proposed amendment. 
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Recognizing valid sentence manipulation claims would reduce sen-
tencing disparity that results from rigidly applying the Guidelines. 172 It 
would also curtail the government's incentive to perpetuate the addi-
tional crime that leads to such disparity.173 The government's decision 
of when to arrest a habitual drug offender would not single-handedly 
determine the offender's sentence. Offenders who pursue a similar 
course of criminal conduct on the street - and who are therefore 
roughly equal in terms of culpability - would more likely serve similar 
sentences. Moreover, sentences would be more proportional to the 
crimes committed. Notwithstanding the Guidelines' largely ineffective 
role-in-offense provisions,174 a drug courier would be less likely to 
serve a similar sentence to that of a drug kingpin just because they both 
were convicted of selling the same quantity of drugs. This exhibits the 
basic understanding that culpability must be considered in sentencing 
- and that culpability depends on individual blameworthiness, not on 
the amount of drugs an offender has in his briefcase. Lastly, recogniz-
ing sentence manipulation claims would ensure that the crimiqal justice 
system punishes crimes sufficiently, but "not greater than necessary" to 
promote respect for the law, deter criminal conduct, protect the public, 
and provide needed training or treatment.175 
CONCLUSION 
As America's drug problem continues to wreak havoc, the last 
thing that courts should do is restrict legitimate law enforcement tactics 
aimed at combating the problem. Therefore courts and commissions are 
justifiably reluctant to take any action that may impede law enforce-
ment's already arduous task. However, there is a difference between re-
stricting police discretionary decisions and limiting their adverse ef-
fects. The doctrine of sentence manipulation seeks only to do the latter. 
In this case, manipulation does not necessarily imply governmental mal-
feasance; it simply implies unfair increases in punishment over which 
an offender has no control. In a quantity-based sentencing scheme, such 
outside influence overrepresents an offender's culpability and leads to 
the very disparity and disproportionality that the Guidelines were de-
signed to prevent. 
I 72. See supra section I.C.2. 
173. See supra section LC.I. 
174. See Miller & Freed, supra note 70, at 5-6; Young, supra note 74, at 64-65. 
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994). 
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The Guidelines were designed to be a good starting point in an ev-
olutionary process aimed at more just sentencing practices.176 But we 
have reached a point where courts are recognizing that there is a prob-
lem with the Guidelines' insistence on quantity-based sentencing: Police 
discretionary decisions can exert too much control over an offender's 
sentence. Federal agents cannot be permitted to investigate the crime 
and determine the sentence of the offender; this excessively blurs the 
tenuous boundaries of our adversarial system. Now it is up to courts 
and the Sentencing Commission to deal with the problem. If the Com-
mission fails to address the issue promptly, courts should exercise their 
authority under the Guidelines to depart downward in cases of sentence 
manipulation under the theory of partially outrageous government con-
duct. The Commission should then learn from these departures and 
amend the drug sentencing provision of the Guidelines to provide a uni-
form rule to address the problem. A thirty-day snapshot would be a 
most reasonable solution. 
176. As then-Judge Stephen Breyer explained, the very theory of the Guidelines 
requires and depends on a learning process to refine and improve the Guidelines. United 
States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1993); see also supra note 136 (Guide-
lines are a "work-in-progress"). 
